In a training wargame post-Time Jump (TJ) situations must: enable the associated Training Objectives, maintain scenario coherence; and present a picture the players recognise as related to their plans. In a research wargame the post TJ situation must: enable the relevant data to be derived to answer the Research Question (or the anticipated aspects of it); and ensure consistency of relevant variables and analysis.

All too often planning a TJ consists of an unstructured discussion based on a loose understanding of what has to be considered, the necessary process and the outcomes and products required. The start point is not ‘where shall we jump to?’ with a subsequent argument of the implications; that is the wrong way around – although often what actually happens. In training wargames TJ consideration is usually reliant on information or plans from the Training Audience (TA); these are frequently incomplete or contradictory due to the inherent pressures of the training environment.

Hence a robust and logical process is essential to draw together all required information, resolve discrepancies and enable the production of a coherent post-TJ situation. Such a process is shown below. The personnel required will vary, depending on each exercise and wargame construct, but the steps below imply who needs to attend.

Time Jump Process

1. Review the event aim and objectives. Apparently obvious, it is amazing how quickly people forget why they are supporting an event. It is always worth confirming understanding of the aim and objectives, even if this is no more than a re-statement of them. Experience shows that time spent reaffirming objectives is time well spent, certainly with respect to ensuring that the post-TJ situation will enable the achievement of those it is designed to address.
2. Confirm the player HQ’s plan. The plan should be briefed to ensure that all elements of Excon – including AAR and analysis personnel – understand it.
3. Confirm any subordinate player HQs’ understanding of their role in the higher commander’s plan. Subordinate HQs could be players or part of Excon.
4. Confirm any critical timelines. One common example of a key timeline is the arrival into theatre of forces; in this instance both the forces available, their desired order of arrival and planned ‘laydown’ must be known. Another example could be developing trends on any of the Comprehensive Approach lines of activity, many of which trends will take weeks or months to deliver results. All such time lines need to be confirmed before the decision is taken where to time jump to.
5. Confirm the plans of other actors in the scenario. Most simply this is the adversary, or situational forces, but it will likely include many other actors such as neutrals, IOs and NGOs, nations’ political reactions etc – the list is long. Controlled by Excon, these actors provide the key variables available to shape the post-TJ situation.
6. Determine the situation required to achieve the reaffirmed objectives. The variables controlled by Excon are compared to the players’ plans. This is to set the conditions for the players to have to make the required decisions, address dilemmas or take whatever actions the event objectives call for.
7. Determine the TJ date. This should fall naturally out of the preceding process. It is that point at which the managed projection of the existing situation into the future is intersected by the players’ plans and the actions of other actors to deliver the situation required to support the objectives. Selecting the TJ point is the penultimate step of the process, not an initial guesstimate to be used as the start point for general discussion.
8. Determine TJ products required by the players, and how and when they will be delivered. These can range from a simple brief to a full set of documents encompassing complete operations orders, annexes etc. The workload must not be underestimated; it has to be assessed in advance and time and people allocated to the task.

Once the process has delivered the new TJ situation this must be adhered to unless a major flaw is identified – in which case the process has not been followed rigorously enough. Subsequent changes usually result in individuals not being aware of them, which risks inconsistency when the new situation is briefed.

There are additional considerations from the players’ perspectives, which apply whether the wargame is in the training or analytical domain. These are:

• Sufficient time must be allocated to allow players to assimilate the new situation before expecting them to make decisions or continue planning. The length of time needed must not be underestimated.
• The new situation must be recognisable to the players. If the proposed post-TJ situation cannot be related to the pre-TJ position then players can react adversely and disengage from the exercise. This is not to say that reverses and set-backs should not be introduced, but these need to be clearly explained and credible.
• The situation must be credible. The conditions must have been set to introduce any major themes or events so they do not come as a surprise to the players.
• Major decisions that the players could have made during the TJ period should be avoided if possible. The risk is that players react to the new situation by saying ‘but we would have done x, y or z to prevent that happening.’ As soon as this happens the players will disengage.

As ever with suggestions on this site, this all sounds straight forward. While logical and simple, do not think it is easy. Sufficient consideration must be given to TJ planning.

Event or incident injects are a key element of almost every training wargame. They feature less in analytical wargames, largely due to the necessity to keep variables constant, but are still important. Injects are called different things by different people, but essentially fall into 2 categories: events and incidents. The distinction between the two is a little loose but the implication is that an event is relatively major while an inject is more minor. The difference is largely irrelevant – as long as you do not draw the inference that an incident somehow needs less planning. This is absolutely NOT the case; any inject, be it an event or an incident, needs careful consideration and management.

The two main terms for injects are:

• MEL/MIL. Master (or Main – both terms are used) Events List and Master Incidents List. This is NATO parlance.
• MSEL. Master Scenario Events List. This is US parlance.

Another term worth noting is a ‘Pick List’ of events and incidents, which is self explanatory. This usefully abbreviates to PL, which also stands for ‘Pressure Lever’. The relevance of this is explained below.

The systems used to manage injects range from sophisticated distributed software applications written specifically for the purpose (such as NATO’s Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM)) to a manually updated white board with a ‘synchronisation matrix’ of injects. There is no right or wrong method, but remember that increasing use of IT generally leads to a greater training burden plus the task of populating the system and then managing the data. As with any aspect of simulation support, the inject management solution should be determined as part of a logical design process applied to the entire wargame event.

However they are managed, the key to ensuring that injects are effective is to make sure that each is a RAT. Every one must be:

• Reasonable. Injects must be credible in the eyes of the participants and, hence, readily accepted. This demands significant effort on behalf of Excon, and this must start well before the inject is executed. Ideally, the setting and scenario should contain ‘hooks’ that enable injects to be played in. Just a line or two of text in the exercise papers, a reference in an intelligence product or a mention in a ‘road to crisis’ media clip is sufficient. It might be that a precursor inject is needed to establish the conditions for the main inject. It is essential that injects do not simply appear ‘out of the blue’ because, if this happens, there is a risk of participants disengaging.
• Actionable. Some injects are designed simply to have an effect on participants, generally to impose a constraint of some kind. The purpose of others is to cause participants to make a decision or take action of some kind. If the participants cannot do anything with, or about, an inject, there is no point using it. The only effect will be that Excon ends up exercising itself.
• Traceable. The rationale for participants’ decisions must be apparent. In a training wargame this enables the After Action Review process, in a research wargame analysis. These are the raison d’être for the respective events so their derivation must be as explicit a possible. The origin and purpose of any inject that influences participants’ decisions must be absolutely clear.

To satisfy the ‘RAT’ (or ART) criteria each inject must be pre-considered, with the following pre-determined:

• Purpose. What is the desired effect on participants?
• Pressure. What level of pressure on participants is required, and can this be raised and lowered as required after the inject is played?
• Trigger. What will trigger the inject, and when? Are any precursor injects required to introduce it?
• Required actions. Who needs to do what to introduce the inject, and how will their actions be coordinated?

As an aside, the same RAT criteria can also be applied to the outputs produced by any simulation supporting a wargame. The penultimate diagram on the what is it page shows that there are two primary means of influencing participants: human in the loop injects; and simulation outputs. RAT (or ART) applies to both.

Anyone with an interest in wargaming, be it professional or recreational, must buy this book.

Mindful of the pros and cons of all the means of delivering wargames (ranging from computer simulations to figures on a tabletop), in ‘Simulating War’ Philip Sabin focusses on board games and other forms of manual gaming. Some might debate the utility of manual gaming to the simulation-dominated professional wargaming field, but I agree wholeheartedly with James Dunnigan’s assertion, quoted in ‘Simulating War’, that ‘to design a decent computer wargame, it’s still safest to go back to a manual design first.’

Phil Sabin has delivered a master class in how to do just that. ‘Simulating War’ is a clear, logical and balanced guide that provides all the building blocks and insights necessary to design manual games and then use them to best effect. This expert knowledge will be just as useful to military planners, trainers and educators alike, to gaming software developers, operational analysts, those in experimentation and to recreational wargamers.

To reiterate: if you have any interest in, or connection to, wargaming then you cannot afford to be without this book. Buy it now.

The ISBN is 978-1-4411-8558-7 or follow this link to Amazon www.amazon.co.uk/Simulating-War-Studying-Conflict-Simulation/dp/1441185585/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1327137275&sr=8-1 where you will find it at a bargain £17.01. Amazon still says the book is available to pre-order only, but copies were delivered last week so don’t delay ordering! Additionally, many of you should be able to justify the – slight – expense through work.

What is a BOGSAT, and why are they dangerous?

Like pornography, a BOGSAT is difficult to define but you know one when you see it. It is, in essence, an unstructured and often poorly prepared discussion, but one that purports to deliver credible and evidence-based analysis to assist decision making. The reality is that the outcomes of a BOGSAT will too often be flawed decisions derived from false assumptions and based on individual opinion or personal bias.

Why does this matter to you?

It goes without saying that we should all strive to make the best decisions in support of our service personnel; their lives depend on it. Furthermore, in the current climate of constrained budgets it is beholden on all of us to deliver optimal solutions. This can only be achieved using effective decision support mechanisms. With increasing scrutiny and potential for the in-depth audit of decisions there is a personal risk in using sub-optimal decision-making processes. The unstructured and poorly planned BOGSAT falls into that category. So please, for everyone’s sake, stamp them out!

Recognising a BOGSAT

BOGSATs must be differentiated from events such as a well-run Military Judgement Panel (MJP), workshop, seminar, Course of Action Wargame or seminar wargame. But the key part of that sentence is ‘well-run’; unless some necessary steps are taken all of the above can degenerate into a BOGSAT. If this happens the evidence-based outcomes that should result will, in all probability, be replaced by ones that lack credibility or are flawed.

BOGSATs exhibit one or more of the following characteristics:

1. Poor structure.
2. Unclear aims.
3. Lack of planning.
4. Having insufficient, or the wrong, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) present.
5. An initial briefing that lacks detail.
6. Insufficiently detailed instructions sent out prior to the event.
7. Insufficient context to enable a meaningful discussion.
8. A vocal or high ranking panellist dominating the discussion.
9. Insufficient facilitators and/or scribes.

Preventing a BOGSAT

In common with most suggestions on this web site, preventing a BOGSAT sounds simple. But do not confuse simple for simplistic, and do not assume it is easy! Unsurprisingly, a successful event is predicated on methodical planning based on a thorough understanding of the type of activity you intend to hold (workshop, MJP, seminar wargame et al), which delivers a structured and logical occasion. The Army adage ‘Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents P*** Poor Performance’ holds true. Attention to detail and a logical and rigorous planning process are required. One example of such a process is given in the Wargame Design Steps on the How we do it page.

Some factors that you might consider that will help prevent an event degenerating into a BOGSAT are:

• Level of information. Presenting the appropriate level of information to participants is critical. Too much and they will be overwhelmed, too little and they will not be able to make an informed judgement.

• Context. Having a context for discussion provides structure and helps people visualise and engage in the event. One example is a scenario, possibly with a series of vignettes adding greater detail. The setting, scenario and vignettes used should be derived from an analysis of the information to be considered and any data that needs to be captured; they should enable discussion of relevant factors. This is not to say that a scenario is compulsory for all activities, but one should at least be considered.

• SMEs. Once you know the topics to be considered and the appropriate level of detail, ensure that the correct SMEs are present. The role of the SME is to ensure that decision makers have sufficient understanding of a topic to make an informed decision. An SME’s role might be proactive (delivering a brief) or reactive (simply answering questions arising).

• Assumptive predictions. People often assume that they can wrap the proverbial wet towel around their head and predict the outcomes of an analysis. Making this assumption bears significant risk and should be avoided if possible. It immediately makes the analysis subjective and precludes any unexpected findings and insights being found. Any assumptions that have to be made during the course of an ongoing analysis must be recorded as such.

• Briefings. Points to be briefed to participants and facilitators should be captured throughout the planning process. These will probably be numerous. A planning team often becomes so familiar with the subject and structure of their prospective event that they forget that it will be new to participants. The opening briefing(s) should cover the basics to ensure that everyone is conversant with what they are expected to do and how they will do it.

• Testex. Once the planning and preparation for an event is complete, try to break it! Hold a Testex a few days before the event where someone outside the planning team tries to cause a failure in the processes, mechanisms and tools that will be used on the day. Expect flaws to be found; that’s the point of the Testex. And be grateful that they weren’t uncovered on the day itself and there is time to rectify issues. The key word is ‘Test’. It is not a ‘Rehearsal’ because that implies that issues and problems have been resolved.

• Recording of findings and data capture. There must be a method for capturing findings and data. This could range from a high-tech data entry system (for example to allow a panel to vote on the priority of the factors under consideration) to a dedicated scribe.

While a BOGSAT might have occasional and limited utility they tend to carry significant risk, particularly when passed off as, or substituted for, a credible evidence-based mechanism for decision support. The risks are likely to reside with the sponsor, be that an individual, desk or branch. We owe it to our servicemen and women and to ourselves to stamp out the BOGSAT.

Our suggested definition of a wargame is:

‘Adversarial by nature, wargaming is a representation of military activities, using rules, data, and procedures, not involving actual military forces, and in which the flow of events is affected by, and in turn affects, decisions made during the course of those events by players acting for all actors, factions, factors and frictions relevant to those military activities.’

Some of you will recognise that this is an updated version of Peter Perla’s 1990 definition. The fact that the original – used in an adapted form by NATO, the US and the UK – remains extant demonstrates its validity after all those years and the many developments in the field. We will discuss aspects of this definition shortly and, by combining it with the elements of a wargame, show how you can test to see whether an activity is a wargame.

But first, why have a definition? As noted in the excerpt on the LBS Blog page, most people in the professional wargaming field have different views of what wargaming is. Too often this leads to miscommunication and a poor understanding of where the wargaming technique can and cannot be usefully applied. Wargaming remains ill-defined and, consequently, misused. Many people consider ‘wargame’ to be synonymous with ‘simulation’. It is not. See why in ‘The 7 Elements of a Wargame’ on the What is Wargaming? page. Within the British Army doctrinal Course of Action (COA) Wargaming is now simply called ‘wargaming’ and is consequently becoming confused with other types of wargaming. Worse still, ‘let’s wargame it’ is a too-often heard cry that precedes an unstructured BOGSAT (Bunch Of Guys Sat Around a Table) during which the authors of a plan loosely discuss said plan and congratulate themselves on a job well done. That is certainly not a wargame!

No-one would consider telling their subordinates to simply ‘go on exercise’. The spectrum of exercises, from adventure training through a warship evacuation drill to a divisional Final Test Exercise is vast. Obviously. So why is not equally obvious that there are many different types of wargame, and the approach taken to their design and execution must vary depending on how they are used?

So, a definition is required to ensure understanding. Furthermore, precise and agreed language is essential for effective communication. We demand this of anyone using mission language so why, in the professional wargaming field, do we accept chronic miscommunication?

But – and this is a Big But – a definition has to be of use. It has to help people understand a term or concept. As Peter Perla pointed out recently ‘It may well be that a single universal definition [of wargaming] is a bad idea in general and we may need to define our use of the word in any particular context’. So the definition offered above has to be applied flexibly. This might sound odd, given the expressed need for a definition and precise language, but think of it in the same manner as doctrine. Doctrine guides us but must not be applied dogmatically. Elements of the wargaming definition will be more or less useful in some circumstances than others. Apply it pragmatically.

Back to the definition. The key elements are: adversarial; players; and decisions. These are fundamental to a wargame. Without them a wargame is not a wargame. But let’s not be dogmatic! Players are the raison d’être of a training wargame but will have a less prominent role in an analytical wargame. The adversarial character of a Seminar Wargame might be small; players might simply be presented a series of vignettes to consider with no interactive Red Cell. Even so, these key elements will be present to some degree in all wargames.

‘…not involving actual military forces…’ is interesting, and again illustrates the agile mindset required when using the definition. Applied strictly, it could rule out activities supported by Live and Virtual simulations because these do tend to involve military force elements. But there are aspects of designing a wargame that are useful in the development of virtual environments such as VBS2. Quickly scan the Wargame Design Steps on the How we do it page and you will immediately see that these steps can be applied to the development of a virtual environment. If, for example, the ‘desired effect on the players’ was to teach Ground Sign Awareness then the ‘level and sources of information’ consideration would inform the development of the simulation and drive the required graphical detail. The debate over the inclusion of this phrase continues. Our feeling is that ‘…not involving actual military forces…’ should remain because it usefully narrows the scope of a wargame. The question of whether activities supported by Live and Virtual simulations are wargames is a useful debate because these are subtly different from activities that use Constructive simulations. In Live and Virtual there is an argument that, as long as the technology works, the role of the technical expert is limited. The training is usually carried out solely by the same military trainers who would conduct it in the absence of Live or Virtual simulations. But military personnel are usually unable to deliver training (or analysis) based on Constructive simulations without a team combining technical, Operational Analysis and wargame design skills. The emphasis in Live and Virtual is on the technology, while in an event using a Constructive simulation it is the processes that make an event succeed or fail. Understanding this is one of the keys to success.

The different types of wargame are described on the What is Wargaming page. Suffice to say that the distinction between the analytical and training domains is critical. Wargames, as defined above, support both areas. However, even though they are all wargames, they must be designed and executed differently, as described on the How we do it page. While reminding yourself of the ‘different types of wargame’ diagram, don’t forget that wargaming is just a technique to support decision making, as are Operational Analysis and Experimentation.

As well as having a definition of wargaming, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the elements that constitute a wargame. These are detailed on the What is Wargaming? page and are:

1. Aim and objectives
2. A scenario
3. Database(s)
4. Model(s)
5. Rules, procedures and umpires
6. Players
7. Analysis

By using this list together with the definition it is possible to determine what is, and what is not, a wargame.

Example 1. Doctrinal COA Wargame. This is adversarial (the Red Cell, acting for all actors, factions, factors and frictions), has players and exists to enable decisions to mitigate risks and issues in a forming plan. There are no actual military forces and the flow of events is affected by, and in turn affects, decisions made during the course of those events. It fits the definition perfectly and contains all of the elements of a wargame, although the database might be a Staff Officers Handbook and the model might be a map with stickies and an Operational Analyst’s spreadsheet. A doctrinal COA Wargame is clearly a wargame.

Example 2. Review of Concept (ROC) drill or Mission Rehearsal. Because they look similar, a ROC drill is often confused with a COA Wargame. But, because it is a rehearsal of a formed plan, it is not adversarial and the flow of events is no longer affected by decisions taken during the event. There is no umpire because all decisions have been taken. There are no players, just spectators. And there is no analysis, only assimilation of one’s role in the plan. On all counts, a ROC drill is not a wargame. But confusion between it and a COA Wargame is endemic, leading too often to neither fulfilling their – very worthwhile but different – aims and objectives.

Example 3. Command and Staff Trainer (CAST). You get the idea. There is no need to reiterate the definition as a CAST fits perfectly. Likewise all the elements of a wargame are present. A CAST event is a quintessential wargame. It could be an educational Staff College wargame or a NATO accreditation exercise (such as those run by the Joint Warfare Centre for HQs about to deploy on operations). It might be an entirely manual Command Post Exercise run at unit level or a multinational exercise with players and control staff distributed around the world. These are all CAST events – and wargames.

Example 4. Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT). Another match to the definition. All the wargame elements are present, although the ‘model’ is the actual ground and umpiring and analysis is done by the directing staff.

Example 5. Seminar Wargame. A Seminar Wargame is ‘a structured discussion between experts in several fields to elicit opinions and judgements from them and to increase understanding’. It is a qualitative activity. All elements of a wargame should be present; indeed, it is these that prevent a Seminar Wargame degenerating into a BOGSAT. In particular, the use of a scenario (to provide context) and objective analysis force a structured and managed event. A well run Seminar Wargame fits the definition, although the dynamic flow of events is likely to be reduced if a predetermined series of vignettes or questions is used. This is the first of our examples where the definition creaks, because it can be argued that predetermined events cannot be affected by players’ decisions. But the point is that a Seminar Wargame will benefit from the application of the analytical wargame design, development, execution and analysis steps outlined on the How we do it page. It is useful to apply these wargame design steps so, even if the definition is not a perfect fit, it is of use when applied flexibly.

Example 6. Experimentation using a Constructive simulation. An experiment is ‘the process of testing the validity of a hypothesis by either a controlled process of interaction or observation, in order to acquire new knowledge about specific factors relevant to some particular decision.’ One might be run to determine future force structures, for example. The Constructive simulation might run a COA many times (the Monte Carlo method) to smooth results and derive the most likely outcome. The role of players in this instance would be limited to determining initial schemes of manoeuvre and making adjustments when changing a variable. But the definition stands up and all elements will be present. This is a wargame.

Example 7. Training squad level Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in a Virtual environment. As discussed above, the training audience is ‘actual military forces’, so that element of the definition can be questioned. Many of the wargame elements are subsumed into the immersive Virtual simulation (potentially all of them except the aim) – but they are still there. This is an example of an imperfect fit to the definition. Maybe Virtual environments are not wargames…but read on!

Why does this all matter, and how can you use the knowledge?

In Example 7 does the participation of actual military forces mean that an exercise in a Virtual training environment is not a wargame? Although an interesting debate, a better question is ‘could the development of a Virtual simulation, or an event supported by one, benefit from the application of a wargame design and delivery processes?’ The answer is yes. So be pragmatic and use wargaming best practice to the advantage of the simulation and any event using one. But deleting ‘actual military forces’ from the definition would allow almost any military activity to be classified as a wargame: a night navigation or live firing exercise, for example. Many important military activities do not benefit from the application of wargaming best practice and so it should not be applied.

Is the consideration of the best way to acquire spares for an aircraft fleet a wargame? Possibly, if it is set up and structured as per the definition and contains the elements of a wargame. This can be done but generally isn’t – and yet this is a real example of procurement executives declaring that what was actually an unstructured BOGSAT was a ‘wargame’ in the hope of persuading scrutineers that a weak decision-making process involved a degree of scientific rigour.

Is a ROC drill a wargame? Absolutely not. So stop confusing it with a COA Wargame. Both events deliver significant benefits but are different activities and must be approached as such.

The list goes on but the point remains the same: wargames can deliver significant benefits in both the training and analytical domains. To achieve these benefits logical and robust design, development and delivery processes must be used. These must be applicable to the wargame. But the first step has to be the recognition that something is a wargame.

Applied with a little common sense, the definition offered above and the elements of a wargame allow you to determine what is a wargame. From there, and in the knowledge that it is applicable, wargaming best practice can be applied to ensure the successful realisation of benefits.

Doctrinal Course of Action (COA) Wargames are mandated in most military decision making processes. And no wonder;  COA Wargaming adds more value to the decision making process than any other step save Mission Analysis.  And the power of wargaming is not limited to COA Wargames, which are just one example of the technique. A well run wargame will deliver stunning benefits across the military training/educational and research/analytical domains, in resilience and in the business arena. And a wargame can deliver results that are often difficult – if not impossible – to achieve in any other way.

These are strong statements, but they are supported by the list below. This is a compilation of the benefits and outputs that a wargame can deliver in a military context. Some will be realised in training games, some in analytical games; that distinction always remains. Read the list and try to think of any other activity that can deliver the same results in as cost effective a manner as wargaming – or at all, for that matter. Some people immediately comment that the list is rather obvious. This somewhat cursory analysis can be addressed by inviting people to carefully examine each point before moving on to the next; ask them to describe its significance (large) and then explain how else it might be realised (at great cost and/or difficulty).

A well run wargame will give you:

• Better decision makers and decision making
• An opportunity to:
  • identify and mitigate risks in a risk-free environment
  • practise key skills in a joint, combined and interagency context
  • reveal unintended consequences
  • test assumptions
• Exposure to:
  • the full spectrum of conflict at all levels, current and future
  • the friction inherent in all military operations
  • an adaptive thinking opponent
• A mechanism for:
  • exploring innovation in the art of war
  • experimentation and exploring ‘what if’ questions
  • developing and refining force structures and operational modus operandi
• Players facing the consequences of a their own decisions
• An enjoyable, challenging and engaging environment

This list makes a very effective PowerPoint slide if you ever present on the reasons for gaming.

Maybe worthy of a blog in its own right, the final point in the list is explicitly addressed in a recent article by Peter Perla called ‘Why Wargaming Works’. This can be downloaded from the Resources page. An excellent article, it differentiates between a ‘presented narrative’ and a ‘constructed narrative’. The latter leads to far greater benefits as the wargame players literally construct events themselves, which leads to greater ownership, more engagement and enhanced internalisation of training. Read the article for more detail. Anyone who wants to examine the genesis of this concept might want to read Mindstorms by Seymour Papert. This 1993 book introduced the concept of ‘constructivism’.

Many thanks to Phil Draper and Andy Wrycraft from Newman and Spurr Consultancy Limited for contributing to the list.

For more discussion of this topic see the What it delivers page. If you have any other points that could be added to the list above please e-mail or post a comment on the web site so everyone can share your insights.

The diagram and explanatory text on the What is Wargaming page shows the different types, or categories, of wargame. Further discussion can also be found elsewhere on the LBS Blog: see ‘There are many different types of wargame, and no ‘one size fits all’ solution’. This Blog entry discusses in more detail the main distinctions between analytical Course of Action wargaming and training (including educational but, for the sake of brevity, grouped here under ‘training’) wargames.

The first obvious difference is in the aim of each type of wargame. The aim of a COA Wargame is to identify the risks and issues in a forming plan for subsequent analysis. Whether the COA Wargame takes place with multiple COAs still open, judging and comparing them for validity, or once a single COA has been selected and is being refined, the process and mechanics are the same. Identified risks (areas of uncertainty) will lead to a COA being discarded or contingency plans for branches and sequels being developed. Identified issues will lead to the rejection of the COA or improvements to the selected plan. This helps decision makers make better real-world decisions. The aim of a training wargame will depend on the event’s Training Objectives (TOs), which could be diverse. However, the overall aim is to make commanders and/or their staff better decision makers.

These are very different aims that can be served – indeed, have to be served – in very different ways. The first table below explains key characteristic differences. The second table explains the necessary differences in approach and the impact these have on the wargame and any supporting simulation.

Characteristic
Analytical COA Wargame		Training Wargame
Can be used to examine either: one complete COA from start to finish; discrete vignettes from one selected COA; and/or several COAs for comparative reasons. The ability to replay a refined COA or vignette is often required.		Tend to play one scenario through to a point where TOs have been achieved, although a Time Jump(s) to a different point can occur. There is seldom any requirement to replay part of the exercise.
Contemporary Operating Environment Force (COEFOR) actions tend to be pre-determined, usually adopting most-likely or worst-case behaviours. COEFOR is usually controlled by the team conducting the analysis.		COEFOR actions are determined as play progresses to ensure the correct level of pressure on trainees and to steer the event to achieve the TOs. COEFOR actions are usually dictated by a Game Controller depending how events unfold.
Preparation and execution must be utterly scientific and rigorous. Processes to identify, capture and measure elements such as Measures of Performance/Effectiveness, metrics, data etc must all be logical and robust, and ensure that outcomes are quantifiable.		While there is no suggestion that a training wargame can be anything other than rigorously planned, there is an element of ‘art’ involved. This is akin to Rommel’s fingertipsgefughel; a good wargame designer will sense that a certain action will lead, or not lead, to a successful training outcome.

From these basic characteristics a number of different approaches become evident, both for purposes of planning the wargame, selecting or writing the simulation software (if one is used) and executing the event.

Approach
Analytical COA Wargame	Training Wargame	Impact
Event outcomes must be highly verified and validated.    They must be as true to life as possible (or at least to the extent required to base a real-world decision on with confidence). They must be transparent, logical  and understandable.	Event outcomes need not be realistic so long as they enable the TOs. Although desirable, they do not necessarily need to be transparent; they can come from a ‘black box’. They just have to be reasonable, actionable and traceable (for AAR purposes).	Entirely different levels of verification and validation are required. Also, COA Wargames and any supporting simulation outcomes must be transparent, while training wargames need not.
Outcomes are deterministic (i.e. results are not random)     or random results are smoothed by repeated runs to determine the mean result.	Outcomes are stochastic (i.e. determined by chance). Although some training wargames feature an adjudication process to smooth results from the ends of the distribution curve, many allow these outcomes to occur, replicating the chance (luck) inherent on real operations.	This is a fundamental difference in the design of a wargame and any supporting simulation.
Repeatability underpins most analytical wargames. A COA Wargame often requires the replay of a complete scenario or selected vignettes after variables have been adjusted. Furthermore, in order to achieve confidence in the outcome, a large number of repeated executions are desirable (the Monte Carlo approach).	The same training audience will seldom repeat a wargame. They will execute it, derive lessons, conduct an AAR and move on.	COA Wargames must be repeatable, either in the entirety of the COA(s) or vignettes within a COA. The ability to ‘turn back time’ and to speed up time is fundamental. Training games are seldom repeated in the same event (although they can, of course, be used as the basis for subsequent events). Some use faster than real time to ‘fast forward’ to a different point in an operation.
The set-up time can be long. This is to ensure that all variables and behaviours have been correctly identified      and pre-considered. If this is not done properly then outcomes and finding can be invalid.	Set-up time is as short as possible. This is to maximise the time spent by the training audience actually training.	Many elements of the scenario in a COA Wargame are determined as part of the COA Wargame preparation. Training wargames are usually based on a pre-written ‘menu’ of scenarios, vignettes, MEL/MIL etc, which are selected for use as appropriate.

The industry-wide lack of understanding of the different types of wargame and their uses is concerning. There is a recent trend within the British military to equate the term ‘wargame’ solely with a Course of Action Wargame. Worse yet, many people assume that there is a one size fits all solution, which is fundamentally wrong. No-one would countenance the idea that the single term ‘exercise’ could describe all the various activities that fall under that heading, so it is with ‘wargame’.

No-one would describe a military activity just using the term ‘exercise’. These can be as diverse as an adventure training exercise, a pairs live-firing exercise, a unit’s Mission Rehearsal Exercise and a formation-level Command Post Exercise – to name just a few. This is not just a matter of semantics; the type of exercise fundamentally affects how that event is planned and executed. Obviously.

The same applies to the many different types and uses of wargame. Remembering, always, that the wargame is not just the supporting simulation (if there is one).

Course of Action wargames, seminar wargames and Theatre wargames are just as diverse as any of the types of exercise mentioned above. So, to, are wargames that support the activities in the lowest tier of boxes in the diagram below (discussed on the What is wargaming page).

As mentioned, this is not just semantics. The approach to designing, developing and executing the various types of wargame to support diverse activities is fundamentally different in each case. See, for example, just the design steps for a wargame in the training domain as opposed to one in the analytical domain outlined on the How we do it page.

We must do better at differentiating and then defining these different types of wargame. Until we clarify our thinking the notion of a ‘one size fits all’ will continue to prevail – to the detriment of those we purport to support; troops on operations.

Although key to the successful delivery of any wargame, the role of wargame designer is little understood. Indeed, many wargaming and simulation practitioners fail to even recognise the need for such a person. The result? Wargames that fail to deliver the massive benefits described on the What it delivers page.

So, what is a wargame designer? He or she is, above all, a facilitator. Someone who can weave together all of the stands involved in designing, developing, executing, validating and refining a wargame, as described on the How we do it page. To do this effectively a wargame designer must have sufficient knowledge of the skills required in each of these steps. He or she might have a background in any of Perla’s principal categories of professional wargamer (military, Operational Analyst or software engineer) but must not be so entrenched in any one silo so as to be predjudiced or risk being drawn into, or distracted by, unecessary levels of detail in any one field. That tends to be the problem when wargames are designed by an expert in any one of Perla’s categories; they focus too much on their area of expertise and do not have the breadth of vision to consider the holistic elements of the wargame.

Furthermore, the Wargame Designer needs knowledge of all 7 elements of a wargame, as described on the What is wargaming page. Hence he or she needs a skill set that encompasses: training design and analytical design (for example of experiments); scenario design and writing; IT; military exercise processes and procedures; and analysis techniques (for example after action reviews and scientific analysis).

Due to the complexity of many modern wargames it is also desirable to have knowledge of project management (including change management and configuration management) and more general skills such as stakeholder management.

Add to all this the necessary communication and people skills and you will find that such a combination of talents is rare indeed! In 20 years LBS has come across no more than a handful of such people throughout the UK, NATO, ABCA and Netherlands wargaming and modelling and simulation industries. And yet a wargame designer is vital to maximising the huge benefit that a wargame can deliver.

Finally, remember Peter Perla’s quote from the How we do it page: ‘It is important to make one thing clear at the very start; designing a wargame is an art, not a science. Experienced military officers, practised operational research analysts, and accomplished computer programmers are not necessarily capable of designing useful wargames. Although some or all of the knowledge and skills for such people are important tools for a wargame designer to possess, the nature of game design requires a unique blending of talents.’ (Perla, P. The Art of Wargaming, Naval Institute Press, 1990).

A good wargame designer possesses this blend of talents, and is as much artist as scientist. A rare find.

The key basic definitions that the M&S industry should agree on are listed below. Note that these are fundamental to communication within the M&S and professional wargaming fields. They exclude overly technical aspects of the industry. These require full working group action with the requisite Subject Matter Experts in attendance, circulation around the industry for validation and verification, agreement and then publication. This latter should be through the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) and/or as a NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG), Five Nations Agreements and ABCA standards etc.

You will find an article on the Resources page and a Case Study that go into more detail and suggest definitions, but the basic terms that require agreement are:

Setting and Scenario
Simulation, Stimulation, Model and Representation
Wargame!

You might be surprised at this list, thinking that the industry is sufficiently mature to have agreed definitions for these basic terms. The point needs reiterating that LBS sees experts constantly miscommunicating even when using these apparently fundamental words. Maybe you’ll read this and think ‘rubbish’. Go and ask 2-3 colleagues to write down what they think ‘scenario’ or ‘wargame’ mean – you will be surprised at the diversity of their answers!

The situation is even worse when it comes to distinctions. The critical terms that anyone involved in professional wargaming must understand the difference between are:

Validation versus Verification versus Accreditation
Training versus Education
‘A War’ versus ‘The War’ (and ‘Future War’)
Training Wargame versus Analytical Wargame

LBS sees these terms being used either interchangeably or downright erroneously all the time; to do so risks designing and delivering a poor wargame (whatever one of those is!).