Computer and manual simulations are complementary. Each does some things well, and some poorly (or not at all). This complementary approach using both manual and computer sims is described in detail here. The key concept was for RCAT to ‘estimate’ (model) kinetic and non-kinetic events for the following day so that kinetic outcome parameters could be given to the ABACUS real-time computer sim operators and the likely consequences of player decisions and combat could be pre-considered, scripted and injected in real time the next day in a coordinated manner (using Exonaut, an exercise management tool).

ABACUS crashed one lunchtime during the execution phase of Ex IRON RESOLVE 15, retaining only the ability to move icons and hence sTimulate the Training Audience Common Operations Picture (COP). While not suggesting that a manual simulation can entirely replace a computer sim on such large-scale exercises with a distributed COP, RCAT did take over from ABACUS to drive all exercise activity in near real-time until the computer sim was operational again the next morning. A simple process was quickly devised to enable this.

The RCAT ‘next day’ wargame usually considered events for the following 24 hour period. The non-kinetic and geo-strategic ‘wrap around’ already devised remained valid for the time period during which ABACUS was down. ‘All’ we had to do was determine the kinetic combat outcomes. We did this by breaking the overall period into bite-sized ‘pulses’ of 2 hours each and wargamed each pulse about 30 minutes before it occurred in real time.

Using RCAT’s Operational Analysis (OA) functionality, we determined the most likely combat results plus the best and worst cases to give a spread of outcomes for the pulse. The Game Controller either accepted the most likely results or moderated these within the best and worst case parameters to suit the exercise requirement. The selected outcomes were then collaboratively scripted between the various cells (Red, Orange, White etc) and the relevant Blue Locons. This script therefore produced a series of inject serials sent from the relevant Blue Locon – supplemented by Hicon and flanks as necessary – to the Training Audience at the agreed real time at which the event(s) occurred. Icons were moved as necessary on ABACUS to reflect movement.

The process for each 2-hour pulse consideration was:

• Blue Locon and relevant cell brief anticipated activity the 2-hour period.
• OA determination using RCAT land, air and air-land combat mechanisms.
• OA back brief to Game Controller and Locons/cells.
• Game Controller determination of pulse outcomes and ‘end state’.
• Scripting of serials by relevant Locons and relevant cells to cover the 2-hour period.

Within the 2-hour real-time pulse period Locons then:

• Injected serials; and
• Moved COP icons.

This was so simple that it took maybe 10 minutes to devise the process, 20 minutes to run the first pulse and about 10 minutes per pulse thereafter. The Training Audience were not even aware of the change in simulations driving the exercise.

It is worth reiterating that there is no suggestion here that manual sims can or should wholly replace computer sims. Each can do things that the other cannot. However, there is an inescapable conclusion that manual simulations remain just as capable of running large-scale exercise as they always were ‘back in the day’. They need to be supported by a computer sim with a COP function, but this can have far less (expensive) capability than those currently assumed to be essential to run exercises.

“When ABACUS had a temporary failure RCAT was used to coordinate all EXCON feeds into the training audience. This was done in 2 hour chunks of time and I believe that, whilst not as dynamic as a computer simulation, it did generate outcomes to cover what was probably one of the most challenging period of the exercise (for example a massed artillery attack on the training audience, an event based on current lessons from the Ukraine conflict). Perhaps RCAT could, at the higher formation CPX level, be used to do more than set parameters for a computer simulation and take more of an active role in driving LOCON/adversary interaction?”

“RCAT allows parameters, based on OA, to be set for all LOCONs/EXCON cells so that computer simulation tools (namely ABACUS), which can sometimes give undesired outcomes, can be kept on track to deliver CTOs and not derail a higher formation CPX by destroying entire battlegroups in minutes. For this function the RCAT team are critical in providing the analysis.”

“RCAT was fundamental to exercise delivery as it provided the central EXCON control mechanism for DYNAMICALLY coordinating all synthetic wrap activity. Injects are inserted at the appropriate time/space (not predetermined by a fixed MEL/MIL), they can be used to reward success, and punish failures, of the training audience. As all EXCON SMEs are present it ensures all injects are collaborative and the 2nd and 3rd order consequences are considered.”

“RCAT provides the best vehicle for considering wider exercise injects (civ/mil, local governance, humanitarian assistance, etc) to be incorporated into the exercise, as these cannot easily be simulated using computer based tools. It also allows SMEs to consider the consequences of the training audience actions and feed the potential outcomes into the next wargame.”

In order to better explain the relationship between the constituent parts of a wargame I developed a simple analogy that proved most helpful. All actions required and issues arising could be explained in terms of the analogy, which helped Excon and support staff understand their role in the wargame and how best to progress it.

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Why do we need a Testex?

The ‘Design’ phase steps of the wargame creation process, above, are listed on the How we do it page.

The Testex is probably the most important element of the next phase: ‘Develop’. The article ‘The Top 3 Errors in Computer Assisted Exercises and How to Avoid Them‘ available from the Resources page (Avoiding common errors in Computer Assisted Exercises (CAX)) lists the ‘Develop’ steps:

1. Validate the scenario, simulation(s) and data. Ensure that these support the exercise aim and Training Objectives (TOs). They must also be sufficiently realistic (verified) to enable participants to ‘suspend disbelief’ and believe in their immersive virtual environment.
2. Play-test the simulation(s) and systems; try to break them. Ensure that the simulations contain the correct level of detail and are playable in accordance with the exercise level, timelines etc. Capture all Lessons Identified (LI).
3. Play-test the exercise processes. This is the principal testing of the procedures that will make or break the exercise. Rehearse staff in their game roles, preferably in a mini game. Capture all LI.
4. Prepare the final rules. Incorporate LI from the wargame Design phase and steps 1 to 3 of the Develop phase.
5. Create an audit trail. Document all decisions taken and the reasons for them.

Steps 1 to 3 and much of steps 4 and 5 can be covered in a single Testex, although preparation and follow-up actions are obviously required. To attempt these often diverse activities separately and outside a consolidated Testex is difficult and risks not identifying weaknesses.

Testex Agenda Items

The following are suggested as Textex items in an educational/training context (as opposed to an analytical event):

1. Confirm the Testex purpose: to try to break the proposed processes and systems. Stressing these is the best way to identify points of weakness in time to rectify them before the actual event.
2. Confirm the wargame TOs. Blindingly obvious but too often forgotten.
3. Processes. Test the following as far as resources allow, ideally in a 24-hour mini-exercise that replicates the actual event:
   1. Player HQ battle rhythms. Walk these through, ideally in real time but, at the least by talking through the various boards, meetings, VTCs or whatever. Will any be held in central plenary so that all players can watch?
   2. Excon battle rhythm. This must fit around (not disturb) the player HQ battle rhythms. The same 24-hour mini-ex should be held concurrent with the player HQ one to ensure meetings align. Again, if a real-time mini-ex can’t be held, a walk-through talk-through should suffice. This should include each meeting’s:
      1. Purpose.
      2. Attendance list.
      3. Outline agenda items.
      4. Inputs and outputs.
      5. Anticipated duration.
   3. Excon processes. See the diagram at the bottom of the What is Wargaming page (a ‘generic setup for a training/educational wargame’). Every text box and arrow on the diagram should ideally be set up during the Testex and stressed with activity that is as close to the reality of the event as possible. For example:
      1. Excon/player interfaces: COP update process; RFI system; e-mail etc.
      2. Exercise Management System (Exonaut, JEST, MEEDS etc) if used. Otherwise, how will injects be managed?
      3. AAR. How, by whom and when are points collected? When are AARs scheduled? Who will lead them?
      4. Player pressure. How is this gauged and fed back to Excon so the degree of pressure on the players can be adjusted as appropriate?
      5. Simulation result adjudication. If featured, this should feature as a meeting(s) in the Excon 24-hour mini-ex.
      6. Locon and simulation operator processes. What is the Locon/player HQ relationship (Secondary Training Audience, Response Cell etc?) How will orders be passed to Locons? Test this during the 24-hour mini game if possible.
      7. Role players. How many are required, and to cover what areas? How will they be briefed and controlled?
   4. VIP visits. How will these impact the exercise?
4. Scenario. Ideally give the scenario to someone unfamiliar with it to read and then ask their judgement. Is it too simple or too complex? How long does it take to assimilate? Is the amount of COE and CJIIM representation broadly correct? Does the scenario include enough of the following to allow players to start planning:
   1. Geo-strategic information.
   2. Theatre of Operations information.
   3. Strategic Initiation documents.
   4. Crisis Response Planning information.
   5. Force Activation and Deployment information.
   6. Startex material (INTSUMs, ‘Road to crisis’ video etc).
5. MEL/MIL. Although dynamic scripting during the actual event is most flexible, the Testex should include a MEL/MIL workshop to review draft topics and themes. All injects must be tied to the TOs and have enough guidance to be developed by SMEs in-game. Identify where the modification/introduction of MEL/MIL injects creates a requirement for additional supporting paperwork (e.g. the text of a new UN resolution, media product etc). Agree how these additional products are to be created and by whom.
6. Mapping. Agree the exercise requirement for both paper and electronic mapping, considering the geographical areas to be mapped and the size/scale of the maps. Also consider if environment-specific maps are required (e.g. air or sea charts). Determine which applications (e.g. PowerPoint, ComBAT etc) will need to ingest electronic maps, and the file formats they require.
7. Adversary COAs. Ideally get someone (maybe the person who just read the scenario papers) to develop an outline ‘Red’ plan in a 1-sided game, and both sides’ plans in a 2-sided game. This quasi-Red Teaming approach gives a feel for COAs but also provides a start point for play-testing and assessing balance of forces.
8. Play-test execution/post Time Jump situations. Ensure that any post Time Jump situations can deliver a narrative that will satisfy the TOs.
9. Play-test balance of forces. In a 1-sided wargame the balance of forces needs to deliver a narrative that satisfies the TOs. Should a 2-sided game be fair? Play-test vignettes to get a feel for likely outcomes.
10. Technology:
    1. Simulation and sTimulation setup, integration and testing. Use the outline COAs developed above as a vehicle to test systems integration, plus COA development and rehearsals of likely event outcomes (experimenting with simulation results).
    2. COP. Including all required symbology, annotations, MOE etc.
    3. Laptop configuration.
    4. Room layouts, terminal and projector requirements.
    5. RFIs, e-mail as above.
    6. Exercise Management System as above.
    7. Stand-alone logistic and planning tools. Compare outputs against the primary simulation(s).
    8. Internet and intranet access.
11. IT training burden. Once identified, when will this take place?  Who will perform this training?  Who will provide “helpdesk” software support during the exercise?
12. Briefing points and in-briefs. Much of the above will result in points that need to be briefed to students and/or Excon staff. These points need to be captured and in-briefs prepared and rehearsed.
13. Summary & Action Plan.  This is the audit trail. Produce notes summarising the Testex against the agreed agenda (formal minutes are usually not required), then agree a plan (details, owner, due date) for all actions raised during the Testex.

The list above comprises suggested items; it is not comprehensive. Please bear in mind, also, that it pertains primarily to a staff college educational/training environment. In an analytical context far more attention would need to be paid to considerations such as data capture, the recording of insights, the choice of analytical methods and so forth.

In a training wargame post-Time Jump (TJ) situations must: enable the associated Training Objectives, maintain scenario coherence; and present a picture the players recognise as related to their plans. In a research wargame the post TJ situation must: enable the relevant data to be derived to answer the Research Question (or the anticipated aspects of it); and ensure consistency of relevant variables and analysis.

All too often planning a TJ consists of an unstructured discussion based on a loose understanding of what has to be considered, the necessary process and the outcomes and products required. The start point is not ‘where shall we jump to?’ with a subsequent argument of the implications; that is the wrong way around – although often what actually happens. In training wargames TJ consideration is usually reliant on information or plans from the Training Audience (TA); these are frequently incomplete or contradictory due to the inherent pressures of the training environment.

Hence a robust and logical process is essential to draw together all required information, resolve discrepancies and enable the production of a coherent post-TJ situation. Such a process is shown below. The personnel required will vary, depending on each exercise and wargame construct, but the steps below indicate who needs to attend.

Time Jump Process

1. Review the event aim and objectives. Apparently obvious, it is amazing how quickly people forget why they are supporting an event. It is always worth confirming understanding of the aim and objectives, even if this is no more than a re-statement of them. Experience shows that time spent reaffirming objectives is time well spent, certainly with respect to ensuring that the post-TJ situation will enable the achievement of those it is designed to address.
2. Confirm the player HQ’s plan. The plan should be briefed to ensure that all elements of Excon – including AAR and analysis personnel – understand it.
3. Confirm any subordinate player HQs’ understanding of their role in the higher commander’s plan. Subordinate HQs could be players or part of Excon.
4. Confirm any critical timelines. One common example of a key timeline is the arrival into theatre of forces; in this instance both the forces available, their desired order of arrival and planned ‘laydown’ must be known. Another example could be developing trends on any of the Comprehensive Approach lines of activity, many of which trends will take weeks or months to deliver results. All such time lines need to be confirmed before the decision is taken where to time jump to.
5. Confirm the plans of other actors in the scenario. Most simply this is the adversary, or situational forces, but it will likely include many other actors such as neutrals, IOs and NGOs, nations’ political reactions etc – the list is long. Controlled by Excon, these actors provide the key variables available to shape the post-TJ situation.
6. Determine the situation required to achieve the reaffirmed objectives. The variables controlled by Excon are compared to the players’ plans. This is to set the conditions for the players to have to make the required decisions, address dilemmas or take whatever actions the event objectives call for.
7. Determine the TJ date. This should fall naturally out of the preceding process. It is that point at which the managed projection of the existing situation into the future is intersected by the players’ plans and the actions of other actors to deliver the situation required to support the objectives. Selecting the TJ point is the penultimate step of the process, not an initial guesstimate to be used as the start point for general discussion.
8. Determine TJ products required by the players, and how and when they will be delivered. These can range from a simple brief to a full set of documents encompassing complete operations orders, annexes etc. The workload must not be underestimated; it has to be assessed in advance and time and people allocated to the task.
9. Brief the new TJ situation. If a brief is to be given it should be rehearsed if possible. As a primary means of conveying the new situation to the players, the TJ brief is a critical activity. If it is not clear in every respect it will, at best, slow down player assimilation of the new situation and, at worst, risk achieving the event objectives.

Once the process has delivered the new TJ situation this must be adhered to unless a major flaw is identified – in which case the process has not been followed rigorously enough. Subsequent changes risk individuals supporting the exercise not being aware of them, which leads to inconsistency when the new situation is briefed or developed.

There are additional considerations from the players’ perspective, which apply whether the wargame is in the training or analytical domain. These are:

• Sufficient time must be allocated to allow players to assimilate the new situation before expecting them to make decisions or continue planning. The length of time needed must not be underestimated.
• The new situation must be recognisable to the players. If the proposed post-TJ situation cannot be related to the pre-TJ position then players can react adversely and disengage from the exercise. This is not to say that reverses and set-backs should not be introduced, but these need to be clearly explained and credible.
• The situation must be credible. The conditions must have been set to introduce any major themes or events so they do not come as a surprise to the players.
• Major decisions that the players could have made during the TJ period should be avoided if possible. The risk is that players react to the new situation by saying ‘but we would have done x, y or z to prevent that happening.’ As soon as this happens the players will disengage.

In common with all suggestions on this site, this sounds straight forward. While logical and simple, do not think it is easy; considerable consideration must be given to TJ planning.

Military strategy: War games

To understand war, American officials are playing board games

Mar 15th 2014 | From The Economist print edition p.41

TWO evenings a month, four dozen defence and intelligence officials gather in an undisclosed building in Virginia. They chat informally about “what if” scenarios. For example: what if Israel were to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites? Recent chats on this topic have been fruitful for a surprising reason, says John Patch, a member of the Strategic Discussion Group, as it is called. Nearly a quarter of those who regularly attend play a board game called Persian Incursion”, which deals with the aftermath of just such an attack. For half the players, such games are part of their job.

You don’t need a security clearance to play Persian Incursion. Anyone can order it from Clash of Arms, a Pennsylvania firm that makes all kinds of games, from Epic of the Peloponnesian War to Pigs in Space. Yet playing a war game is like receiving an intelligence briefing, Mr Patch says. It forces players to grapple with myriad cascading events, revealing causal chains they might not imagine. How might local support for Iran’s regime be sapped if successful Israeli raids strengthen claims that its anti-aircraft batteries were incompetently sited? Might a photo purportedly showing Iran’s president with a prostitute help the Saudi monarchy contain anti-Jewish riots? Might those efforts be doomed if the photo were revealed as a fake?

Paul Vebber, a gameplay instructor in the navy, says that in the past decade the government has started using strategy board games much more often. They do not help predict outcomes. For that, the Pentagon has forecasting software, which it feeds with data on thousands of variables such as weather and weaponry, supply lines, training and morale. The software is pretty accurate for “tight, sterile” battles, such as those involving tanks in deserts, says an intelligence official. Board games are useful in a different way. They foster the critical but creative thinking needed to win (or avoid) a complex battle or campaign, he says.

Some games are for official use only. The Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a federally funded defence outfit, has created half a dozen new ones in the past two years. Most were designed by CNA analysts, but commercial designers occasionally lend a hand, as they did for Sand Wars, a game set in north-west Africa.

CNA games address trouble in all kinds of places. In Transition and Tumult, designed for the marine corps, players representing groups in Sudan and South Sudan try to whip up or quell local unrest that might lead American forces to intervene. In The Operational Wraparound, made for the army, players struggle to stoke or defeat a Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Avian Influenza Exercise Tool, a game designed for the Department of Agriculture, shows health officials how not to mishandle a bird-flu epidemic.

Board games designed for the government typically begin as unclassified. Their “system”, however, becomes classified once players with security clearances begin to incorporate sensitive intelligence into it, says Peter Perla, a game expert at CNA. If an air-force player knows that, say, a secret bunker-busting bomb is now operational, he can improve the dice-roll odds that a sortie will destroy an underground weapons lab. During official gaming sessions, analysts peer over players’ shoulders and challenge their reasoning. Afterwards, they incorporate the insights gleaned into briefings for superiors.

One reason why board games are useful is that you can constantly tweak the rules to take account of new insights, says Timothy Wilkie of the National Defence University in Washington, DC. With computer games, this is much harder. Board games can also illuminate the most complex conflicts. Volko Ruhnke, a CIA analyst, has designed a series of games about counterinsurgency. For example, Labyrinth: The War on Terror, 2001-? (sold by GMT Games of California) models “parallel wars of bombs and ideas”, as one reviewer puts it, on a board depicting much of Eurasia and Africa.

Even training for combat itself can be helped with dice and cards. Harpoon, a game about naval warfare, has proved so accurate in the past that hundreds of Pentagon officials will play it when the next version comes out in a couple of years, says Mr Patch. One of its designers, Chris Carlson, is also responsible for the “kinetic” aspects of Persian Incursion (ie, the bits that involve shooting). Mr Carlson is a former Defence Intelligence Agency analyst; Persian Incursion’s data on the nuts and bolts of assembling and commanding bomber, escort, and refuelling aircraft “strike packages” for destroying Iran’s nuclear sites is so precise that on at least two occasions intelligence officials have suggested that he is breaking the law by publishing it.

I was advising the new Captains’ Warfare Course (CWC) on Course of Action (COA) Wargaming recently. This involved a presentation and then floor-walking during their syndicate COA Wargames during a planning exercise. The latter was a relatively straight forward battlegroup deliberate attack to clear enemy up to a river and set the conditions for a subsequent crossing.

The first point is that the COA Wargame was good. This is noteworthy in itself as the majority I see are characterised by a lack of knowledge and poor execution. I was immensely heartened by the COA Wargaming I saw and hope that this is because the – indispensible – technique is being taught from Junior Officer level. I hope that the SOHB COA Wargaming sections wot I wrote are also helping (see Resources).

Beyond stating that the COA Wargaming was good, a number of ‘standard’ lessons were learned, which I have seen repeated in the 15+ years I have been writing and advising on COA Wargaming. The ‘Dos and don’ts’ table in the COA Wargaming article on the Resources page remains extant and captures these.

There was one ‘stand-out’ observation, which pertains to positive risks. Risks (‘an area of uncertainty’) identified during COA Wargaming are usually negative and require CONPLANS or similar mitigations. But they can also be positive, presenting opportunities (which might also require CONPLANS). In this instance the CWC students had COA Wargamed through their clearance of the enemy and had progressed up to the river, revealing the strong possibility that the attacking Blue battlegroup was still likely to be at a good state of Combat Effectiveness (CE). At which point the Red (enemy) Cell announced that their Reaction in one turn was to retreat whatever small remnants of their forces remained over the river, probably in disarray. The Blue Cell Counteraction, having achieved their given mission (clear enemy south of the river in order to set the conditions for a subsequent deliberate river crossing operation), was to let them go. Mission achieved; time for tea and medals.

Wrong answer. This is a good example of a positive risk being identified that could be exploited. The area of uncertainty was along the lines of ‘what if the enemy are in such disarray that we could pre-emptively seize a river crossing?’ But this didn’t occur to the Blue Cell, and no-one else suggested it – even though it was clear in the higher commander’s intent that a river crossing was to follow. Bearing in mind that the Blue battlegroup could well be at a high state of CE with, probably, an uncommitted reserve, how easy would it have been to identify this positive risk (opportunity) and add a ‘be prepared to’ task? This could have been given to the reserve or even the attacking echelons, to the effect of seizing a crossing if the opportunity presents. Think Guderian after Sedan in 1940 seizing the opportunity of pushing into the French rear.

As a career opportunity on actual operations, imagine the reaction to the message to the higher formation HQ : “Mission accomplished – oh, and we’ve just established a bridgehead across the river saving you 24 hours, getting right inside the enemy’s OODA loop and 16 Air Asslt Bde can now conduct a forward passage of lines rather than an opposed obstacle crossing.” That’s tea and medals territory.

As an addendum, this brought to mind the fact that British doctrine for the longest time included ‘Find – Fix – Strike’, but ‘Exploit’ was only added as an afterthought. I recall a sage superior reminding me of the historical doctrine of ‘Pin – Pivot – Pounce – Pursue’. Pursue was a fundamental element, but got – temporarily – lost along the way. Maybe it’s still not fully re-established.

None of which should detract from a good COA Wargaming experience, which is great news.